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Remote Sensing and Diplomacy 
Ann M. Florini 
ABSTUACT. The advent of a variety of commercial and national remote-sensing satektes 
has eliminated a long-standing superpower monopoly on a key source of information about 
gioba( events. As these systems prohferate, it wil/ become increasihgly dij%ult to maintain 
secrecy about certain sensi>ive activities. Nations other than the superpowers wiU be able 
independent/y to ve$j compliance with arms control accords, and to monitor globa/ “hot 
spots. ” These new capabilittks both reflect and contribute to an inevitable d?jiisz& ofpower 
among nations. Although there wi// be adj’ustment costs, particuhrLy for the superpowers, 
the enhanced global transparency is /iReiy to promote gLobal stability and thus to benefit 
humanity as a who/e. 
&troduction 
In the last few years, it has become possible for anyone willing to spend a few thou- 
sand dollars to buy satellite imagery of virtually any spot on Earth. French, Ameri- 
can, and Soviet companies are filling orders, many of which are being placed by the 
news media. The availability of this new source of information became widely known 
when satellite images of the nuclear power reactor at Chernobyl covered the front 
pages of the world’s newspapers after the accident in April 1985. Although the com- 
mercial satellites provide far cruder imagery than is available from the highly secret 
superpower spy satellites, this publicly available imagery clearly can have substan- 
tial military, political, and economic significance, a capability that will only increase 
as new systems come into operation. And countries from India to Israel to Canada 
are developing or operating their own satellite systems. 
Thus, policymakers face the prospect of a world in which many nations have their 
own spy satellites, and many commercial operators are willing to sell militarily sig- 
nificant data on the open market. In such a world, transparency rather than secrecy 
will be the order of the day. Although satellites do not provide a good means of 
observing all activities everywhere in the world, given the size of the planet we live 
on, they are very good at confirming or disproving information gleaned from other 
sources and at keeping an eye on selected trouble spots. 
This new transparency is likely to have a number of consequences: 
Ann F/or&n is Studies Coordinator at the Center for International and Strategic Affairs, 
Universdy of Cahfomti, Los Angeles, where she specdi’es in space policy, the pohtics 
of intewaationd cooperation, and intematibnd environmend policy. Her previous work 
on satellite remote sensing inch&es “The Opening Skies: l&d-Pmty Imaging Sate/lites 
ad U.S. Secusity, ” International Security, Vol. 13, no. 2 (Fal1988), pp. 91-123. 
57 
Published in Technology in Society, 1989, Vol.11 (1), pp.57-65.
http://doi.org/10.1016/0160-791X(89)90040-7
58 A. M. Florini 
1. It will become increasingly difftcult to maintain secrecy about preparations for 
military activities; 
2. Global access to once-secret information could restrict governmental flexibility 
during negotiations or crises; 
3. Differing interpretations of data could exacerbate tensions within the NATO 
alliance; 
4. Regional arms control agreements could be negotiated that would exclude the 
superpowers; and 
5. The media could publicly verify-or counter-government claims about activ- 
ities around the world. 
Existing and Planned Systems 
Satellites have been used since the early 1960s for national security. In the most dra- 
matic and well-known example, the first US photo reconnaissance satellites demol- 
ished the missile gap myth. US Air Force claims that the Soviet Union had produced 
and deployed hundreds of SS-6 ICBMs could not be verified by aerial reconnais- 
sance, given the small area that a U-2 could cover and the frequent cloud cover over 
much of the vast Soviet territory. The US spy satellites, which could photograph 
much wider swaths of territory from their higher altitude, took thousands of pho- 
tographs at one-meter resolution and found few signs of the large missiles. In fact, 
analysts concluded from the imagery that the Soviets had deployed only a hand- 
ful of ICBMs. 
Thus, satellite reconnaissance is not new. But for the past quarter-century, the 
superpowers, who had the only satellites, have refrained from embarrassing each 
other through the public release of imagery from their spy satellites. This policy, 
initiated by the United States, had two purposes. It encouraged the Soviets to ac- 
cept, at least tacitly, the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance, rather than to develop 
means to shoot the satellites down, and it kept the world from knowing in detail 
the capabilities of the US system. The United States also imposed limits on the capa- 
bilities of its civilian remote-sensing satellites so that they could not reveal militarily 
significant information, and the Soviets did not distribute data from their remote- 
sensing satellites beyond the Soviet bloc. All this is now changing. 
In addition to its military uses, space is also an effective platform for gathering 
information on civilian matters ranging from crop conditions to geological for- 
mations, oceanography, urban planning, and land use patterns. These civilian 
applications have spurred development of a variety of commercial and national 
remote-sensing satellite systems. 
There are at present three satellite operators competing to sell data: one Ameri- 
can, one Soviet, and one French. The American system, called Landsat, is the oldest, 
initiated as an experimental program by NASA in 1972, although it was turned over 
to the private sector in 1985. It is now operated by the Earth Observation Satellite 
Corporation (EOSAT), which hopes eventually to make a profit from the sale of sat- 
ellite imagery. Landsat data have been used by private military analysts to exam- 
ine Soviet military installations on the Kola peninsula. 
The French SPOT system has had perhaps the most dramatic effect on interna- 
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tional politics. Like Landsat, SPOT imagery is available through a private firm 
(SPOT Image Corporation), which claims that it will sell imagery of any place on 
Earth. Since the first SPOT satellite went up in early 1986, SPOT images have 
appeared in a variety of ‘interesting places. ABC News has run several stories featur- 
ing SPOT imagery, the trade journal Aviation Week andSpace TechoLogy has put 
SPOT pictures on its covers, and a British newspaper has bought SPOT imagery of 
Israel’s nuclear reactor at Dimona.’ 
The Soviet system is both the most and the least significant of the three. Only 
the Soviets are offering imagery at resolutions as good as five meters, but the Soviet 
marketing agency Soyuzkatia can require several months to fill an order. For some 
scientific research purposes, such a delay is acceptable, but for political/military ana- 
lysts - and particularly for the media- timeliness is crucial. In addition, Soyuzkarta 
will not sell imagery of socialist countries. 
A number of other countries have developed national satellite remote-sensing sys- 
tems, including China, Japan, and India. According to some forecasts, at least 24 
Landsat-type remote-sensing satellites will be launched in the next decade. The 
European Space Agency (which includes most of Western Europe), Canada, and 
Israel have remote-sensing programs under way. These programs have a mix of civil- 
ian and military purposes. China already has and France and Israel are pursuing 
dedicated military reconnaissance systems, and all of the civilian systems inherently 
possess some reconnaissance capability. 
All these satellites share certain characteristics, such as a common orbit. They 
travel over the poles, in order to see all of Earth as the planet rotates beneath them. 
Many have similar instruments and missions. It has been suggested that the civil- 
ian systems be combined in some sort of international agency, possibly modeled on 
Intelsat. In addition, plans being formulated by the major space agencies for an 
international program of environmental monitoring (variously known as the Inter- 
national Geosphere/Biosphere Program or Mission to Planet Earth) will require shar- 
ing of satellite data and analysis, and may encourage further development of 
remote-sensing technology. 
The Value of Satellite Data 
The security value of the data that will be available from the existing and planned 
systems is a matter of some debate, but it is clearly not negligible. The usefulness 
of the satellites depends on their resolution. Resolution has two meanings. Ground 
or spatial resolution refers to the size of an object on the ground that a sensor can 
distinguish, at least sufficiently to tell that there is something there. Spectral reso- 
lution deals with the various band of the electromagnetic spectrum (e.g., blue, green 
or red visible light, infrared, or microwave in the case of radars) a sensor can de- 
tect.* The term “resolution” is usually used to refer to ground resolution. A good 
rule of thumb is that resolution of 20 meters or less (in other words, the ability to 
detect objects 20 meters in size or larger) is primarily useful for civilian purposes, 
while resolution of 10 meters or better starts to reveal militarily significant infor- 
mation. However, exceptions exist in both directions. In particular, the civilian sys- 
tems, which orbit at higher altitudes and thus can observe larger areas of the planet 
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at a time, can provide what in military jargon is called area surveillance. It is note- 
worthy that since the 1985-86 series of launch system failures left the United States 
temporarily bereft of the ability to maintain a full complement of spy satellites, the 
Department of Defense has been a major consumer of Landsat and SPOT imagery. 
The 1988 edition of Soviet Mi&a~ Power features several SPOT images of Soviet 
military installations. 3 
As mentioned above, satellites are perhaps most useful as a means of confnm- 
ing information from other sources. Unless a very large number of satellites are in 
orbit, and a large percentage of their imagery is processed and analyzed, it is unlikely 
that their operators would simply stumble across anything smaller than large military 
exercises or invasions. However, in most cases of interest, such collateral informa- 
tion does exist. Countries undertake military action against other countries at times 
of tension, not simply out of the blue. The media often have stories or rumors that 
could be confirmed by satellite data. For example, ABC News was aware of the 
preparations for the Grenada invasion, but chose not to run the story when a Pen- 
tagon source claimed that the ships being mobilized were on their way to Lebanon. 
And as more satellites with more capable sensors go up, it will become more dif- 
ficult to avoid detection. To date, the superpowers have been able to keep many 
activities secret by tracking each others’ spy satellites and simply covering up when 
a satellite was overhead. During preparations for the attempted rescue of the Ameri- 
can hostages in Iran in 1980, American military personnel in Egypt stepped into 
an airline hanger whenever a Soviet satellite passed above.* This easy evasion will 
become difficult if dozens of remote-sensing satellites are circling the planet. 
The proliferation of sharper eyes in the sky could in fact turn out to be a boon 
for international stability. Remote-sensing satellites can expose exaggerated estimates 
of a foe’s military strength, just as the first US reconnaissance satellites revealed the 
fallacy of a “missile gap. ” Satellite data could allay unwarranted fears of a surprise 
attack-and reduce the temptation to try to launch one by increasing the likelihood 
that preparations will be discovered and the advantage of surprise lost. 
US Policy Making 
For many years, the United States tried to restrict the capabilities of civilian remote- 
sensing satellites to ensure that their publicly available data would not violate na- 
tional security. Until 1986, this policy was effective because the only civilian remote- 
sensing system was Landsat, operated by the United States. The launch of SPOT 
in 1986 removed the US monopoly, and the announcement in 1987 that the Soviets 
would begin selling better-resolution imagery made it clear that resolution restric- 
tions for US civilian satellites no longer made sense. In January 1988, the govern- 
ment announced that it would no longer limit the resolution capabilities of US 
commercial remote-sensing satellites. 
In the United States, verification has become the crucial determinant of progress 
in arms control. Although the government’s access to superior intelligence informa- 
tion (such as its spy satellites) will continue to give it the upper hand in debates over 
the verifiability of proposed arms control accords, other interested parties can now 
draw on commercially available satellite imagery to illustrate their cases. This also 
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enables those with access to classified information to publicize their cases without 
directly leaking classified information to the public. A Newswee, article on author 
Tom Clancy, whose novels deal extensively with national security affairs, noted that 
in at least one case the author relied on classified information when he bought com- 
mercial satellite photos of a Soviet space-defense research site for use in a forthcom- 
ing novel. The article claims that Clancy’s letter ordering the photos from a private 
satellite operator, “shows that he must have had access to classified information avail- 
able only to offrcials who had seen imagery from a KH- 11 spy satellite,” because 
the letter describes the number and size of the buildings at the site and gives the 
exact coordinates.5 When CIA officials tried to persuade Clancy to remove the de- 
scription from his novel, claiming that the information was restricted for national 
security reasons, he showed them the commercial photos that revealed much the 
same information. 
The media can also use satellite imagery to illustrate both sides of debates over 
national security issues. Perhaps the major current issue in superpower arms con- 
trol is the status of the Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk. The US alleges, probably cor- 
rectly, that the radar clearly violates the ABM Treaty’s prohibition on radars that 
could track missiles over Soviet territory. The Soviets claim that the radar, which 
is still incomplete, is intended to track objects in space. ABC News jumped into 
the fray with a report on April 2, 1987 that showed a SPOT image of the radar. The 
story concluded that the imagery showed that the Krasnoyarsk radar does in fact vio- 
late the ABM treaty. 
Thus, during negotiations or domestic debates over foreign policy, various fac- 
tions may use satellite imagery to bolster their arguments. This could confuse the 
debate as much as clarify it. Interpretation of satellite imagery is not easy. The media 
have been known to make mistakes, as they did in the case of Chernobyl when 
several stories on television and in the press claimed that two reactors had been 
damaged. In fact, only one had-the reporters were misled by a second “hot spot” 
that was probably a reflection from a roof. It is also easy to inject one-sided infor- 
mation, as has often occurred in debates over national security issues using infor- 
mation from other sources. 
This problem exists, of course, with all sources of information, but there is a 
strong tendency to believe pictures- even if it is necessary to take someone else’s 
word as to what the pictures show. To the extent that independent analysts and 
additional countries gain the capability to accurately analyze satellite data, this prob- 
lem will be ameliorated. 
Alliance Relutions 
The political value of scarce intelligence information from satellites has been a sig- 
nificant source of US influence over its allies. The Western European countries and 
Israel have depended on the United States not only for military muscle but also for 
information about their security situation. The allies have frequently, if quietly, 
complained that the United States has been stingy in the extreme with data from 
its highly sophisticated military reconnaissance satellites. This reluctance to share 
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the goods has given these countries a strong motive to develop independent satel- 
lite capability. 
Western Europe trails only the superpowers in the scope and sophistication of its 
satellite remote sensing programs. It is developing both commercial remote sens- 
ing and military reconnaissance capabilities. The French SPOT civilian system already 
sells imagery at finer resolution than is currently available from the US Landsat 
system. 
SPOT technology is also providing the basis of a military reconnaissance satellite 
called Helios, scheduled for launch in 1992. Helios is expected to provide one-meter 
resolution and near-real time imagery-which are militarily significant capabilities. 
Like SPOT, Helios will be dominated by the French, long known for their hostil- 
ity to American dominance of Western security decision making. Italy and Spain 
are also participating in the Helios project. 
More broadly, Western European countries band together to share satellite tech- 
nology and derived information. Through the European Space Agency (ESA), 13 
countries are already collaborating on a series of remote-sensing satellites, scheduled 
for first launch in 1989. 
The ERS series, which will include a radar with 30-meter resolution, is intended 
primarily for oceanographic purposes. But Western Europe’s interest in satellites, 
particularly radar, is likely to grow for other reasons. Progress on nuclear arms control 
means that the conventional arms balance has become more important. Arms con- 
trol, through the INF Treaty, has already eliminated intermediate-range nuclear 
arms in Europe. If the START negotiations are successfully concluded, large num- 
bers of longer-range nuclear weapons will be scrapped. The US commitment to the 
defense of Western Europe has long been symbolized by the nuclear umbrella. 
While that umbrella is not about to fold up altogether, some Europeans fear that 
it is developing holes. With the greater importance of the conventional balance, 
Europeans will want to be able to assess for themselves the state of that balance. 
This will also enable the NATO allies to conduct independent verification of arms 
control. The existing model of restrictions on non-nuclear arms, the measures agreed 
to under the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), calls for 
advance notification of major troop movements and permits challenge on-site inspec- 
tions to investigate potential violations of the treaty. By the 199Os, European nations 
will have the ability to detect unusual activity that would justify a challenge inspec- 
tion. They are thus increasingly free of dependence on US technical means to assure 
Soviet compliance with such agreements. 
One group of Dutch analysts found several reasons why an independent Euro- 
pean satellite surveillance and identification capability would be desirable.’ The 
report’s points are couched in the delicate language of diplomacy, but can be sum- 
marized as follows: 
1. It would add to transparency, and, by reassuring the European public that deci- 
sions are not being imposed on an ill-informed Europe by the United States, help 
to garner European public support for NATO decisions. 
2. The existence of multiple and independent sources of information would con- 
tribute to the quality and even-handedness of NATO alliance decision making, 
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both for assessing the balance of conventional forces and for verifying arms con- 
trol accords and confidence- building measures. 
3. It would add to alliance surveillance capacity at a time when existing NATO 
capacity may be overloaded by an increasing number of agreements, and would 
serve as a form of burden-sharing. 
4. It would provide for continued coverage of Europe if the United States were to 
turn its attention elsewhere, such as the Pacific Rim. 
5. It would enable the Europeans to focus on specific areas of European concern. 
6. The frequent cloud cover over Europe requires somewhat different technology 
than has been used by the United States. The US spy satellites use the visible- 
light part of the electromagnetic spectrum, which allows very detailed images, 
but cannot penetrate clouds. Radar, which sends active pulses rather than relying 
on reflected light, can.’ 
Clearly, it would require close cooperation among European national intelligence 
services to make effective use of such a system. This cooperation could, in turn, spur 
even more extensive forms of cooperation on security matters among NATO’s Euro- 
pean members. The group also noted that Europe could sell data to non-NATO 
members, or exchange data for other intelligence information. It would even be pos- 
sible to exchange data with the East bloc as a confidence-building measure. 
Other US allies are also developing independent satellite capabilities. The Israelis 
have long depended on the United States for information vital to their national secu- 
rity, and, like the Europeans, have been dissatisfied. The recent dramatic initiation 
of the Israeli space program probably represented the frost in a series of steps towards 
independent reconnaissance capability. On September 19, 1988, Israel launched its 
first satellite. The New York Times cited Israeli Cabinet Minister Mordechai Gur, 
a former army chief of staff, as saying that Israel began working on a reconnaissance 
satellite after deciding that it could not rely on the United States to provide full 
intelligence.* Gur said specifically that the United States had failed to provide ade- 
quate information during the 1973 war. 
Multilateral Satellites 
The superpowers have long staunchly resisted any suggestions for the establishment 
of an international satellite agency, arguing in part that arms control is largely a 
bilateral affair and that its verification should be handled exclusively by the par- 
ties. Future arms control, however, will not be largely bilateral. Accords on chemical 
weapons, ballistic missile proliferation and nuclear proliferation are necessarily mul- 
tilateral. Satellites have already proven useful in monitoring nuclear weapons pro- 
liferation, and have engendered some striking cases of international cooperation. 
In one well-known example, Soviet satellite photos in 1977 revealed secret prepa- 
rations for a nuclear test in South Africa. The Soviets alerted the Americans, who 
used their own satellites to confirm the story and then used diplomatic leverage to 
induce the South Africans to desist. More recently, commercial satellite imagery has 
been used to follow the course of construction of the secret nuclear facilities in 
Pakistan.9 
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Canada has suggested that multilateral “Paxsats” could contribute to verification 
of multilateral arms control accords. These satellites would be developed by countries 
other than the superpowers, and would utilize radar technology being developed 
under a Canadian civilian radar program. In addition to the obvious boost to Cana- 
dian industry, were this suggestion adopted, the proposal is part of a broader Cana- 
dian effort to carve out a niche for itself in third-party verification. 
Sweden is also looking into the role a neutral country could play in satellite ver- 
ification and monitoring. In a press release dated September 13, 1988 from the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry, Minister for Foreign Affairs Sten Andersson emphasized 
that neutral countries should become involved in disarmament, and that this was 
one way in which Sweden was prepared to become involved. The Swedish ground 
station at Kiruna is already a major facility for the reception and analysis of SPOT 
data, and Sweden owns 6% of SPOT. 
Economic Implications 
For many years, a bitter struggle was carried on in the halls of the United Nations 
over the question of who had rights to the economically valuable data gathered by 
satellites. US policy from the early days of Landsat was to sell all data to anyone will- 
ing to pay (and initially at heavily subsidized prices). Developing countries feared 
that they would not be able to compete with multinational corporations from the 
industrialized nations, which could afford to buy and analyze data that could reveal 
information about oil deposits and other economically valuable data about resources 
in their countries. Access to such information would provide companies with a 
marked advantage in negotiations for prospecting and development rights. The 
developing countries wanted to establish a right of prior consent to the release of 
any information gathered about their territory. The First World argued that satel- 
lite data were relatively inexpensive and readily available to all. The West, and par- 
ticularly the United States, argued that the principle of the free flow of information 
should prevail, especially given that the information was gathered in space, which 
under international law cannot be claimed as sovereign national territory. The Soviet 
bloc sided with the Third World. 
The Western position has apparently prevailed. In 1986, the United Nations 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space adopted by consensus a set of legal 
principles on the dissemination of data gathered from civilian satellites, which were 
subsequently adopted in turn by the United Nations General Assembly. The prin- 
ciples make no mention of any prior consent right. According to various represen- 
tatives involved in the COPUOS talks, there were two reasons for the adoption of 
the Western position. First, it became obvious that the United States would not back 
down, and there is no way to enforce restrictions on space activities over the oppo- 
sition of the leading space power. Second, several other countries which had orig- 
inally supported the prior consent concept decided that their interests lay more in 
protecting the rights of their own satellite systems than in restricting the rights of 
others. The issue of the legal principles governing remote sensing has thus been set- 
tled, and removed from the UN Committee’s agenda. 
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Conchion 
The advent of widespread satellite remote-sensing capabilities both reflects and 
intensifies the on-going diffusion of power among nations. It is not a process that 
can be stopped. It is most obvious in the case of Western Europe, where Europe’s 
growing capabilities and interest in satellite remote sensing have been in part spurred 
by concerns over the reliability of the American ally, and partly by the desire to be 
economically competitive in civilian remote sensing. The same reasoning may apply 
to Japan, which is developing civilian satellite remote-sensing systems but has said 
very little about the possibility of military reconnaissance. 
There may be some uncomfortable moments as nations adjust. In particular, the 
superpowers will have to accept the loss of their monopoly, with the diplomatic 
leverage and military advantage it has brought. More open societies, such as the 
United States, will find the overall adjustment easier than will nations accustomed 
to being able to hide their secrets, at least from the public and the media. Indeed, 
the superpowers may eventually find themselves in competition to take the lead in 
promoting, rather than combatting, transparency. If both countries recognize the 
inevitability of the process, they may decide that it is in their long-term interest to 
be seen as promoters of international openness. In general, the greater transparency 
that the satellites will bring will contribute positively to international stability. 
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